The Bank of England in the provinces : the case of the Leicester Branch closing,1872 by ZIEGLER, Dieter
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
E U I W O R K I N G  P A P E R  No. 8 9 / 3 9 2
The Bank of England in the Provinces:
The Case of the Leicester Branch Closing, 1872
Dieter Ziegler




























































































No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form 
without permission of the author.
© Dieter Ziegler 
Printed in Italy in June 1989 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 





























































































Many books and articles have been written in the past about the 
Bank of England in the nineteenth century, but they have almost 
always been confined to its role as a central bank, i.e. the main 
devices such as the Bank rate, open market operations etc. Even the 
two outstanding multi —volume Bank of England histories by 
Clapham and Sayers1 display little interest in the Bank’s 
commercial business. This is the more surprising as the Bank was 
still a privately owned profit-making institution. It paid a dividend 
of about 9 % a year from the mid — eighteenfifties until the First 
World War. This was not very much compared with other joint 
stock banks at that time, but the Bank had a much larger portion of 
proprietors’ capital in the balance sheet liabilities (mostly deposits) 
than the other joint stock banks and its non-interest bearing 
securities were also substantially larger than those of the joint stock 
banks. The fact that the Bank of England got its deposits for 
almost nothing while the other banks had to pay interest for them, 
could only partly compensate for these disadvantages. Therefore 
one would expect a very active commercial business policy to allow 
the Bank to achieve these results. It is the intention of this article 
to provide a little mosaic stone in this plain white map of the Bank 























































































































































































Our knowledge about the Bank of England’s commercial business in 
the provinces is even worse. Some articles2 have been written 
about the history of certain country branches, but even these are 
confined only to the second quarter of the nineteenth century when 
the Bank founded its country branches as a device to increase the 
circulation of Bank of England notes in the provinces.3 In 1826 
the Government, in order to avoid a repetition of the 1825/26 
financial crisis, changed the currency and banking laws (7 Geo. 
IV, c. 6 and c. 46). The Bank of England monopoly of joint stock 
banking was abolished, but on the other hand, the new law 
allowed, and the Government even pressed for, the opening of 
Bank of England Branch Banks outside London. The main reason 
held responsible for the crisis was the excessive fluctuation of bank 
notes issued by hundreds of country banks. The Government as 
well as the Bank’s Court of Directors tried to achieve a ’much 
more complete control...over the whole paper circulation’4 by the 
Bank. According to Clapham the provision to strengthen the Bank’s 
deposit base in order to stand the competition of the new joint 
stock banks was another motive, but only second to the one 
mentioned above.5














































































































Exeter 17.12.1827 (closed 1.5.1834) 
21. 4.1828
2. 1.1829 (closed 14.2.1939) 
1.12.1829 (closed 31.5.1852)
Then a couple of years later the Bank opened branches in Plymouth 
(1.5.1834, transfer of business from Exeter) and Portsmouth 
(16.5.1834), primarily in order to facilitate payments at the Naval 
Yards, following a request by the Treasurer of the Navy to open 
Bank of England branches in Plymouth, Portsmouth, Chatham and 
Pembroke.6 The last country branch, opened about 20 years after 
the first one, was the Leicester Branch (1.1.1844).7 At that time, 
the year of ’Peel’s Act’, which changed the Bank’s attitude towards 
its country branches considerably, the 13 country branches were the 
largest set of country branches the Bank ever had. But compared 
with the Banque de France8 and later the Reichsbank,9 this was 
not impressive.
With the passing of ’Peel’s Act’ the country branches lost their 
main function — to increase the Bank of England note circulation 
at the expense of the country banks — and with it the interest of 
modem economic historians.10 ’Peel’s Act’ limited the note issuing 
rights of every bank in England. Apart from its £14m fiduciary 




























































































covered in full by gold. The 72 joint stock and 207 private banks 
were only allowed to issue a total of £8.6m in 1844. In order to 
maintain a sufficient margin within their individual free note issue 
the amount actually issued by country banks was considerably less 
in the aggregate. This was even more true when, about the ’sixties, 
the cheque superseded the bank note as the most commonly used 
means of payment in business transactions. At this time there was 
probably not a single ’pure’ note issuing bank in England. While 
retaining their note issuing licence, all of them had to switch over 
to the more promising future as deposit banks.
The second function of the country branches, i.e. the collection 
of deposits, similarly became less important in the middle of the 
nineteenth century. In the ’twenties the country branches had been 
extraordinarily successful in this field. The balance sheet of 31 
August 1831 shows drawing account balances of £728,000 com­
pared with £5.1m balances of private accounts in Threadneedle 
Street.11 But very soon the country branches’ ability to attract 
deposits ceased, because neither the Branch Banks nor Threadneedle 
Street were prepared to pay interest on deposits. The joint stock 
banks did so and therefore the mass of deposits that flooded into 
the banking sector from the middle of the century did not touch the 
Bank of England and its Branch Banks. During the ’sixties and 
’seventies the drawing account balance yearly averages of the 
country branches were quite stable around a total of £2m.12 But 
even in the dull late sixties, this was not enough to cover the 
Branch Banks’ assets. With only a few exceptions the country 
branches had to draw from Threadneedle Street.13 The branches 
with a very unfavorable deposit/discount ratio were Leeds, 




























































































Birmingham and Liverpool (see Table 1). Naturally the collection 
of deposits was still regarded as an important function of the 
branches, but without paying interest their means to fulfil this aim 
were very limited.
Table 1: Deposit/Discount Ratio of Bank of England Country
Branches (1853 -1872)
Year Birmingham Leicester Country Branches
1853 42 16 59
1854 20 17 45
1855 26 28 39
1856 36 30 36
1857 32 21 30
1858 56 29 76
1859 58 26 75
1860 40 31 50
1861 43 36 59
1862 65 38 81
1863 44 32 65
1864 42 34 46
1865 23 44 40
1866 54 53 46
1867 109 60 79
1868 109 96 114
1869 66 61 87
1870 49 89 78
1871 58 86 85
1872 88 86
Source: Bank of England Archive, Branch Bank Office, Annual 




























































































The new functions of the Bank of England country branches 
therefore were:
1. to provide the provinces with sufficient means of payment, 
because under ’Peel’s Act’ the country banks were not able to cope 
with the eventually increasing (’legitimate’) demand for cash (notes 
and coins) in times of pressure,
2. the remittance of funds between London and the provinces,
3. the collection of Government revenue and the payment of divi­
dends,
4. mainly from the ’seventies and ’eighties onwards, to provide 
clearing facilities for the local banks, and
5. not to curtail the Bank’s earnings.
The rather aggressive competition against the issuing banks, which 
the Bank introduced in the late twenties in order to increase the 
circulation of its Branches’ bank notes, did not only have a very 
positive impact on the finance market of certain regions in general,14 
but also led to a constant increase in the Branch Banks’ income 
from discounts.
’Peel’s Act’, however, changed the situation. As prescribed by 
the Act, the Bank of England was divided into two departments. 
The Issue Department, responsible for the issue of notes, was 
completely outside the control of the Bank’s Court of Directors, but 
on the other hand the Banking Department ’should be governed on 
precisely the same principles as would regulate any other body 
dealing with Bank of England notes’ (Peel).15 While the Bank’s net 
income from the Issue Department was very low,16 because the 
Treasury took the lion’s share of the profit derived from the fidu­
ciary note issue,17 bread and butter for the shareholders had to be 




























































































business in a fairly modem sense. This led to a change in the 
Bank’s attitude towards its discount business. From 1822 to 1844 
the Bank of England Head Office charged 4% as minimum rate 
constantly. Only during periods of high pressure was the rate of 
discount raised to 5% and only once, for seven months in 1839/40, 
to as much as 6%. But from 1844 onwards the Bank charged a 
fluctuating rate ranging from 2% (or even less from 1878 when 
alongside the official minimum the Bank introduced an unofficial 
minimum rate for its ’sole’ customers) to 10% (in 1857 and 1866), 
as the market demanded. This strengthened its competitiveness in 
London. But there were no positive effects of this change as far as 
the Branch Banks’ business was concerned, because the country 
rates were fixed independently of both London and the other 
Branch Banks. The outcome was that the branches very often 
charged a considerably higher rate than Head Office — not re­
garding the fact that from 1845 onwards the Branch Bank rate of 
discount was a minimum rate for ’first class bills’. ’First class 
bills’, however, might not have often appeared in the Branch 
Banks’ discount business.18
Under these conditions only Head Office was almost entirely 
able to secure a sufficient dividend. From about the mid —forties to 
about the mid —eighties the Head Office had no intention of pro­
moting the country branches in order to enable them to add to the 
Bank’s earning capacity. The obviously uncompetitive regulations of 
the branch banks’ discount business were opposed to any attempt of 
the Branch Agents to attract new customers. Consequently the 
amount discounted at the country branches displayed no substantial 
change in the average for the decades in the mid-nineteenth 




























































































competitiveness of Threadneedle Street’s discount business (see 
Table 2).
Table 2: Amount discounted at the Bank of England country 
branches (yearly averages)
Source: Bank of England Archive, Special Discount Committee 
Reports, C 35/2 — 4.
One might expect therefore, that from the late forties onwards 
the Bank would begin to get rid of the burden of those country 
branches which had lost their function as a promoter of Bank of 
England notes and which could only be maintained at considerable 
loss. Clapham explains how Gloucester, the first branch, had been 
opened by the Bank with the expectation of meeting an urgent 
demand in that town and hence of opening up a new source of 
income.19 The Bank's Committee of Branch Banks, inquiring into 
the possibility of opening branches in several towns, received a lot 
of letters from Gloucester assuring it that a Branch Bank of 
England would be welcomed by the trading community of that city, 
because many local banks had to close their doors during the after- 
math of the financial crisis.20 Unfortunately this proved to be a 
rather over —optimistic view and the Gloucester branch was also the 
first Branch Bank of England to be closed.21 According to Roberts 
the situation of the Swansea branch was not dissimilar. The Bank 





































































































profit.22 When this expectation proved to be wrong, the Bank 
decided to close the Swansea branch, too. Finally, even the retiring 
agent of the Norwich branch himself advised the directors of the 
Bank to close the Norwich branch in 1852, because ’it was hopeless 
to expect the Branch to be run profitably, Gurney’s (Bank) secured 
the cream of the business.”23
The second feature of the Bank’s attitude towards its country 
branches in the third quarter of the nineteenth century was the 
introduction of a new method of assessment of the Branches’ Profit 
and Loss Accounts. A report of the Court of Directors’ Branch 
Bank Committee about the performance of the Leicester branch 
during the previous 15 years, explained what they regarded as an 
up to date Profit and Loss Account for the Branch Banks: ’... the 
Committee have had the accounts made up, not in accordance with 
the mode adopted in the Branch Banks’ and Accountant’s Offices, 
where credit is taken for profits of circulation, but on the plan 
regarding only the commission and the interest on deposits as 
profitable sources of revenue.’24 This is indeed the most obvious 
departure from the past. The alleged evil of the country notes was 
almost completely eliminated and consequently the Branch Banks’ 
survival became more dependent on their pure commercial success. 
This is worth noting, because it proves that the most important 
reforms in certain local finance markets, which were introduced 
indirectly by the Branch Banks’ appearance in the market, were not 
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Only about one year before ’Peel’s Act’ promoted these 
changes, the Court of Directors decided to open a new branch in 
Leicester. The Bank took the opportunity to take over the business 
of the local issuing bank Clarke, Mitchell & Philips.25 The ex­
pectations of the Directors were twofold: ’It is considered that the 
consequent withdrawal of a large amount of local notes by the 
recent failure of the bank of Clarke, Mitchell & Co. offers a fair 
opportunity to the Bank of England to the extension of their note 
circulation into that part of the kingdom... The Committee <of 
Branch Banks > do not contemplate a large profit in the first 
instance, but they have reason to believe that the Branch will pay 
its expenses with a surplus and with a fair prospect of increasing 
profit.’26 Despite Leicester’s vicinity to Birmingham these ex­
pectations on the surface seemed to be justified, because Leicester 
fitted well into the criteria of suitable locations for Branch Banks. 
Leicester was a manufacturing centre with a large agricultural 
’hinterland’, where country notes were still the most important 
means of payment. The directors, however, did not scrutinize the 
prerequisites for a Bank of England Branch in Leicester and were 
obviously content with the testimony of the Nottingham private 
banker I. C. Wright.27
The Bank’s expectations concerning Bank of England note 
circulation and profitability, however, again proved to be over — 
optimistic. At best the Branch Bank was partly successful. Although 
Leicester’s Bank of England note circulation was higher than the 
circulation of any other Branch Bank of its size, it was mostly at 




























































































customers, like the Nottingham bank I. & I. C. Wright, previously 
drawing their notes from Birmingham, transferred their business to 
the more conveniently situated Leicester Branch. The Leicester 
country banks, however, were not prepared to abandon their note 
issuing rights. In 1844 their authorized issue was fixed at 
£178,000, i.e. about the same amount as the Leicester Branch Bank 
of England note circulation. Even in the early ’seventies they still 
circulated about £130,000.
Equally contrary to the Branch Banks Committee’s expectations 
was the inability of the branch from the beginning of its operations 
to attract the expected quantity of deposits, because the local 
competitors were quick to attract many of the former customers of 
Clarke, Mitchell & Philips to themselves.28 They succeeded in 
doing this, because firstly the Bank did not pay interest on balances 
and secondly because it was not prepared to offer the same credit 
facilities to the traders and manufacturers as the local banks. In the 
very first report the Branch Agent sent to the Branch Banks Office 
in London he foresaw one of the main future problems of the 
Branch: ’All bankers whom I have seen concur in stating that 
manufacturers here required at certain periods of the year advances 
in open account, or on securities not admissable in the Regulations 
of the Bank.’29 And less than one year later he had to admit: ’I 
have scarcely any working accounts (that is, the accounts of traders 
and manufacturers) from the circumstances of our not making the 
advances so universal in this district.’ He therefore declared himself 
unable to force the existing accounts to keep larger balances, 




























































































As the Leicester Branch had probably no advance business at 
all, there remained — apart from the allowance for circulation — 
only the discount business as source of income. Although the 
Bank’s rules concerning the eligibility of bills of exchange were 
also restricted, the Bank was able to compete with the local banks 
at least for certain classes of bills. For those traders and manu­
facturers who had close connections with London, it might have 
sometimes been favourable to discount bills with London acceptors 
at the Leicester Branch Bank of England, because these bills were 
discounted at 3.5% during the years of easy money while the local 
banks charged 4% minimum.31 Equally important for the building 
up of Leicester’s discount business was Branch Agent Turner’s 
close connection with the local gentry. Immediately after the 
opening of the Branch he began to offer special facilities to the 
local charities in order to induce the local gentry to come to the 
Bank.32 In this he was fairly successful, because his lifestyle was 
such as to increase the prestige of the Bank. His aristocratic habits 
probably enabled him to build up connections with people, who 
were not prepared to deal with a bank clerk, such as a manager of 
a joint stock bank.33
Although there were neither many ’discount accounts’ (only 5 
regular accounts until 1854 and less than 20 in the subsequent 
years) nor many ’drawing accounts’ discounting bills of exchange 
from time to time (with the exception of the early ’fifties between 6 
and 37 only) at the Leicester Branch Bank of England,34 its dis­
count business grew to a rather satisfactory level of between 
£600,000 to £900,000 discounted bills per year.35 During the 
’fifties the discount business of the Leicester Branch was relatively 




























































































aggregate was rather pro-cyclical — heavy demand in 1856 and
1857 and a considerably lower demand in the early fifties and in
1858 and 1859 —, the Leicester Branch discount business did not 
have a peak, even in absolute figures in 1856 and 1857, and so its 
share in the country branches’ discount business reached its lowest 
figures in 1856 (3.8% of the average amount held in bills of ex­
change of the country branches, compared with a decade’s average 
of 5.5%). Similarly, Leicester’s discount business remained stable 
in 1860 (£163,000 held in bills of exchange compared to £159,000 
in 1859), when the overall demand increased.
In its degree of stability the Leicester Branch differed from 
most other branches, especially those which had a large share of 
’bankers’ discount.36 During the sixties Manchester, for example, 
had an average amount discounted of £4.5m per year (1861 — 
1870), of which £3.1m were for ’bankers’ and £1.4m for ’traders’. 
The standard deviation for the amount discounted was about 40%. 
This very high figure was caused almost exclusively by the 
’bankers” discounts. The situation in Birmingham was about the 
same. The average amount discounted was £2.5m with a standard 
deviation of about 35%, while the ’traders” portion was less than 
£0.5m. The Leicester ’trader’ business accounted for its relative 
stability of relatively high figures during periods of low demand 
and of relatively low figures in periods of high demand. This 
counter — cyclical behaviour was probably highly appreciated by 
Head Office, because the Leicester Branch added to the Bank’s 
income when the Bank was anxious to achieve a sufficient dividend 
and put only moderate pressure on the Bank’s liquidity reserve 
when London had to keep it up while accommodating the ’legiti­




























































































discount business in quiet times was a very important reason for the 
Bank to introduce the fluctuating Bank rate of discount in 1844, 
otherwise the Bank had a large reserve of unemployed notes which 
could not be invested in other securities, because of the risk of a 
discount drain in times of pressure.37
It was a sign of Leicester’s weakness that its discount activity 
followed the overall trend when in the early ’sixties demand 
became slack again, although it still kept its position with a share 
of little less than 5% in the first half of the sixties. The weakness 
became more marked in 1864, when the downward trend of 
Leicester’s discount business continued while the overall demand 
increased substantially. Even the absolute figures decreased re­
sulting in a sharp decline of Leicester’s share in the country 
branches’ discount business (1865: 2.7% and 1866: 2.4%).38 The 
main reason for Leicester’s failure to keep pace with the overall 
development was its inability to keep its ’traders” (as distinguished 
from ’bankers” ) business and from the mid —sixties, its distribution 
of ’traders” and ’bankers’ business’ approached the Manchester 
ratio.
Leicester, however, was no exception. The branch was hit by 
a development which touched probably every Branch Bank of 
England. But as Leicester’s ’traders’ business’ was much more 
important than at most other branches, its decline in the overall 
figures was more serious. Because of the tight regulations all 
branches lost many customers: the number of discounters decreased 
by around 42% between 1861 and 1870.39 There is no doubt that 
’traders’ transferred their business to a local bank, because the 
Bank of England Branch Agent was unable to compete with his 




























































































drawing accounts (only 27 of which were ’mercantile’ as distin­
guished from ’private’) compared to 72 in 1856 (with 40 mercantile 
accounts).40 In consequence the ’traders’ accounted for only 29% 
of the discount business of the Leicester branch in 1866, probably 
the lowest figure ever.41 The relative growth of the ’traders” share 
in the subsequent years was caused by the even more decreasing 
demand of the ’bankers’. In the final years of the decade money 
was abundant and there was no need for the local banks to re ­
discount. If we compare 1868 and 1869 with 1862, the only year 
of the previous business cycle with equally low demand and interest 
rates, there is about the same level of ’bankers” discounts, 
£368,000 and £251,000 in 1868 and 1869 respectively compared to 
£342,000 in 1862, but the ’traders”  discount business was already 
less than one half: £169,000 and £179,000 compared to £402,000. 
Thus the average amount held in bills of exchange, the most 
suitable proxy for the size of the business, decreased from 
£143,000 in 1862 to £96,000 in 1867 and £57,000 in 1868.
The Leicester Branch Agent was probably aware of the 
possible consequences, which a continuous loss might have for his 
Branch Bank. Because, when Agent Turner died in December 1865, 
after running the branch for more than twenty years, it was already 
considered to close the branch. It might have been a guess by the 
directors of the Bank that Sub-Agent Wright would not be able to 
keep those customers who were attracted by Turner’s splendid life 
style. Finally, however, it was decided that the branch should con­
tinue its operations and Sub-Agent Wright was appointed Agent.
Wright possibly knew very well that his success depended 
mainly on his ability to offer some inducement to the manufacturers 




























































































able to offer securities of the class London was prepared to accept 
(Exchequer Bills, Consols, or East India Bonds). The only way to 
secure business ’with some sort of life in it’ was to attract or to 
keep his customers by not strictly observing the regulations for the 
conduct of the Branch Banks. Naturally he did not consult the Head 
Office, because he obviously did not expect authorisation from the 
Branch Banks Office. The extent of the Branch Agent’s individual 
’relaxations’ of the regulations is unknown, but in the second half 
of the ’sixties both the Branch Banks Office and the Court of 
Directors were concerned about the Branch Agent’s unauthorized 
actions.
The main competitive disadvantage of the Bank of England 
country branches was the strict suppression of overdrafts, i.e. a 
book debt to an agreed —on upper limit without the backing of 
additional securities. Overdrafts, although condemned by the 
country banking text —books were granted rather generously by the 
competitors of the Bank of England country branches.42 The 
Leicester Branch Agent circumvented his own Bank’s overdraft 
regulations by discounting bills of exchange which had not yet 
arrived at the Branch Bank. This class of customers, however, 
mostly discounted without having a regular discount account, while 
not intending to fulfil the precondition for discounting without a 
discount account by keeping their sole drawing account at the Bank 
of England. This problem was solved with one partner of a partner­
ship having his sole account at the Bank and applying for such 
disguised overdrafts, while the partnership had, indeed, more than 
one bank account.43 In 1869 the auditors of the Leicester Branch 
Bank ledgers found this practice to have grown to such an extent 




























































































examination about his practices.44 The reason given by the Agent 
was, as one might expect, the general interest of the Bank of 
England that required such competitive measures. After the Agent’s 
commitment to observe the regulations most strictly in the future 
the Branch Banks Committee declared itself satisfied: ’It appears to 
the Committee that Mr. Wright was not actuating by any other 
motive than a desire to secure a larger business for the Bank, but 
the course adopted to attain this end was very reprehensible.’45 
The Committee only instructed the auditors of the Branch Bank 
ledgers to observe very closely the Branch Agents’ adherence to the 
Bank’s regulations. This was probably meant as a warning because 
the Head Office knew very well that Leicester was not a single 
case.
It is therefore hardly surprising that the closing of the 
Leicester branch was again under consideration. The situation the 
Agent had tried to prevent appeared only one month later. The 
Committee for Branch Banks reported the Leicester Branch Bank’s 
performance during the last 25 years.46 According to this report, 
the deposit base of the Leicester branch was still extremely small. 
The most important depositors were five local banks, which had to 
keep a minimum balance to maintain their account. In addition to 
the long —lasting problem of the deposits, even the discount busi­
ness has been continuously decreasing during the previous years. 
This resulted in a continuous loss in the profit and loss account of 
the branch, when profit on circulation was not taken into account. 
Since 1853 the only exceptions were 1860 and 1866, when the 
Bank earned a profit of £636 and £1,067 respectively. From 1853 
(to 1868) the Bank had to bear the burden of a loss of altogether 




























































































without regard to a bad debt in 1854, of about £900 in the normal 
course of business. Finally the Committee asked ’whether it is 
desirable to maintain a branch entailing such an annual loss.’ How­
ever, despite the Deputy Governor’s recommendation to close the 
Leicester Branch Bank of England, the Court postponed any 
decision.
It had become apparent, however, that it was only a question 
of time before the Leicester branch would be finally closed. The 
question was raised again two years later, when the Branch Banks 
Committee reminded the Court of its former report and added that 
the performance of the branch now was probably even worse.47 
Previously, in 1869, the Committee had considered the possibility 
of transferring the business of the Leicester branch to Birmingham: 
’The town is too near Birmingham...that all the subjects of a public 
character could be equally well met by the branch there.’ Moreover 
the most important customers of Leicester were likely to switch 
over to Birmingham, too. But it was only in 187148 that the 
Branch Banks Office drew up a memorandum stating the likelihood 
of a transfer of the principal discounters’ business to Birmingham.
Out of the five local banks mentioned above as having a 
drawing account, only the Nottingham private bank of J. and J. C. 
Wright was a regular discounter. This bank, being a former issuing 
bank,49 was an old customer of the Bank of England. Even before 
the establishment of the Leicester branch, Wrights had a con­
siderable business at the Birmingham Branch Bank of England. 
Consequently they were most likely to transfer their business to the 
Birmingham branch. Among the traders only five had an active 




























































































— Th. Adams & Co., Lace Manufacturer (Nottingham), discount
received by the Branch Bank, £324 in 1870, and transfer of 
business probable.
— Nottingham Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Hosiery (Nottingham),
discount received by the Branch Bank, £334 in 1870, and 
transfer of business probable.
— J. and C. Thornton, Silk Throwsters (Nottingham), discount
received by the Branch Bank, £239 in 1870, and transfer of 
business rather sure.
— W. B. Graham, Agent for Sale of Elastic Webbing (Leicester),
discount received by the Branch Bank, £195 in 1870, and 
transfer of business rather doubtful.
— Robert Scampton & Son, Agent (Leicester), discount received by
the Branch Bank, £138 in 1870, and transfer of business rather 
doubtful.
There was only one conclusion for the Court to draw from this 
evidence. On 14 December 1871 the Directors decided that the 
Leicester Branch Bank of England had to be closed on 29 February 
1872.50 The Leicester Branch Agent was instructed to undertake 
the necessary steps to keep the business of the above mentioned 
customers at the Bank. In his last service for the Bank the Agent 
was fairly successful. As the Branch Banks Office had supposed 
Adams, Thornton and the Nottingham Manufacturing Co. trans­
ferred their business to the Birmingham Branch Bank of England.51 
The same held good for Wrights, who were to be a customer of the 
Birmingham branch until their merger with the Capital and 





























































































The Agent, aged 59, was superannuated, after having been a 
clerk of the Bank in Leicester since the opening of the branch. The 
Bank’s pension to the Agent of £600 (or two thirds of the salary 
before retirement)53 was probably sufficient to keep the standard of 
living of a senior Bank of England clerk. The Agent, however, 
complained bitterly of his compulsory retirement,54 because he felt 
that it implied a punishment for commercial failure, which was not 
his fault. He might well have been able to employ as many funds 
as possible in securities he regarded as perfectly safe. The quality 
of a local security, however, could only be judged by a specialist 
of the local conditions and by personal knowledge of the customers 
and not by a Deputy Governor residing in London.
No doubt, one cannot blame the Bank of England for not 
acting like a country bank. Being banker of the Government, the 
bankers’ bank and the emerging central note issuing agency the 
Bank had enough to do even in the provinces so that it should not 
interfere in the country banks’ business. However, there was no 
clear division of labour between the Bank of England country 
branches and the country banks. The main reason for this ambi­
guous position of the country branches was the Bank’s own ambi­
guousness of being both the central bank and a profit making 
institution. The Agents were told that ’it is the object of the busi­
ness to make profits for the shareholders.’55 Consequently, the 
commercial success of a Branch Bank was even at the Bank of 
England an important step to promote the career of every clerk up 




























































































moving up to the Agentship of a First Class Branch such as Liver­
pool or Manchester.56
One can blame the Bank therefore for poor management and 
supervision. This holds less for the Agents, but rather for the 
directors. Since they created the commercial success as the major 
measure of success in general, they had to be prepared to have the 
Agents circumvent their instructions. This might have created 
additional problems as the customers became used to certain 
practices and got into trouble when accommodation was suddenly 
withdrawn. The disguised overdraft practice was discovered only by 
chance, since a professional auditing system was not introduced 
until 1894. This might have been a reflection of the directors’ own 
ambiguous position, because they were responsible for a sufficient 
dividend and consequently, besides the increase of the Bank of 
England note circulation, an increasing profit derived from the 
branch was expected by the directors when they decided to open a 
branch bank in Leicester. But all the worse, the decision was taken 
on a very weak basis. The directors did obviously not know how to 
achieve these results. The Bank was neither prepared to compete 
with the local banks by bringing their regulations in line with the 
practices of the local finance market in order to obtain a portion of 
the local commercial banking business and thus forcing Bank of 
England notes into circulation, nor were they willing to compete 
with the London Agents by becoming a local bankers’ bank with 
privileged re — discounting facilities in order to induce the local 
banks to abandon their note issue.
The first alternative was out of the question, because the busi­
ness as conducted by the country banks was fundamentally contrary 




























































































bankers) usual commercial habits; or as Agent Turner put it to a 
customer only one month after the opening of the Leicester Branch: 
’The Bank on principle declines to make such advances Con open 
account > , being fully satisfied that the banker ought not find 
capital for his customer.’57 As this and other (already cited) 
memoranda of the Agent indicate, the Bank obviously discovered its 
inability to compete with the local banks in Leicester for ordinary 
business only after having already opened the branch.
As the opening of the Leicester Branch and the passing of 
’Peel’s Act’ came at about the same time, even the Bank’s willing­
ness to work with the local banks disappeared. The competitive 
conduct of the Banking Department in London from 1844 onwards 
enabled the Bank to keep its dividend at a satisfactory level without 
regard to its provincial business. Since the Bank expected a 
quasi — automatic surrender of the country banks’ note issues, it was 
not prepared to induce the issuing banks to do so by making any 
sacrifice concerning the rate of interest on bills re —discounted. The 
local banks were obviously prepared to abandon their note issues if 
the Bank treated them in the same way as the London money 
market.58 The Governors, however, declined: ’It is impossible to 
offer any opinion as to the course which the Court may at any 
future time determine on. It will however be open to Pares, 
whether issuers or not, to avail themselves to the London rate thru’ 
the medium of agents or bill brokers here.’ Thus the Bank was 
prepared, as Sayers commented on the comparable example of 
Taylor & Lloyds in Birmingham, ’to miss an opportunity of 
strengthening its direct hold upon the country banks; it drove 




























































































The history of the Leicester Branch Bank of England therefore 
can be regarded as a typical example of the Bank’s ambiguous 
policy toward the provinces. As long as the Bank was able to 
employ its funds with a sufficient return in the London money 
market or at the Stock Exchange, it could maintain a collection of 
country branches which lost it altogether a few thousand pounds a 
year without alarming the Directors. But this did not mean that a 
particular Branch Bank causing a continuous drain could not be 
closed down, since its closure would not affect the Bank’s ability to 
fulfil definite duties. Every quasi — Government function could be 
met with very little inconvenience both for the Government and for 
the general public by the Birmingham Branch, while the most 
important discounters were located in Nottingham and could be 
expected to experience little additional inconvenience after having 
transferred their business, too. There were certainly other country 
branches, which could equally be maintained at a loss only. But the 
Portsmouth, Plymouth and Hull Branch Banks were either the only 
Bank of England Branch Bank in the whole region or had to pro­
vide a special service as the banker of the Government, as, for 
example, the Naval business in the case of the Portsmouth branch. 
The disadvantage of Leicester’s vicinity to Birmingham was com­
parable with Gloucester and Swansea, the business of which had 
already been transferred to Bristol. Unlike Plymouth and Hull, 










































































































Graph 2: Average Circulation of Bank of England Notes
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